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The Epistemology of Admissibility: Why Even
Good Philosophy of Science Would Not Make for
Good Philosophy of Evidence
Brian Leiter*
I. INTRODUCTION
In its 1923 decision in Frye v. United States,1 the United
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia set out what
was, for seventy years, the most influential test for the admissi-
bility of scientific evidence in federal court. In Frye, the question
was whether the results of a lie detector test were admissible on
behalf of the defense. The Court of Appeals agreed with the trial
court that such evidence was inadmissible, famously holding,
that scientific evidence "must be sufficiently established to have
gained general acceptance in the particular field in which it be-
longs."2 In 1993, the United States Supreme Court ended Frye's
reign of influence with its decision in Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals, Inc.3 Holding that Federal Rule of Evidence
702,4 governing the admissibility of scientific evidence, did not
codify Frye's "general acceptance" test,5 the Court went on to say
that the key question was whether any proffered piece of evi-
dence constituted "scientific knowledge" within the meaning of
the Rule.6 The Court then enumerated a nonexclusive list of
* Joe A. Worsham Centennial Professor in Law and Professor of Philosophy,
The University of Texas at Austin. For helpful comments on earlier versions, I am
grateful to Richard Friedman, Alvin Goldman, Steve Goode, Saul Laureles, Douglas
Laycock, Bill Powers, Charlie Silver, and Guy Wellborn. Thanks also to Mr. Laureles
and Cynthia C. Llamas for valuable research assistance and to Heidi Feldman for
useful feedback-though she should plainly not be presumed to agree with what
follows.
1. 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
2. Id at 1014.
3. 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
4. Federal Rule of Evidence 702 states: "If scientific, technical, or other
specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to
determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill,
experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or
otherwise."
5. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 588.
6. See id. at 589-90.
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factors for courts to consider in assessing whether proffered evi-
dence constitutes "scientific knowledge": for example, whether
the theory on which the evidence is based is "falsifiable" (in Karl
Popper's sense);7 whether "the theory or technique has been sub-
jected to peer review"; and whether the theory enjoys "general
acceptance."' Since Daubert, trial judges must now weigh a com-
plex set of philosophical and methodological factors in deciding
upon the admissibility of proffered scientific evidence, rather
than falling back upon the simple proxy of "general acceptance."
The Supreme Court's repudiation of Frye as the exclusive
test for admissibility of scientific evidence has already generated
substantial scholarly literature.9 From a philosophical stand-
point, the most interesting recent discussion has been Heidi
Feldman's argument that Daubert's rejection of Frye and its
broadening of the criteria for admissibility serve to bring the
Federal Rules of Evidence more in line with what Feldman dubs
"revised empiricist" philosophy of science, and thus with actual
scientific practice." Feldman commends this move toward a
"more scientific approach to admissibility,"11 especially because
its consequence will be, according to Feldman, a greater recogni-
tion of scientific uncertainty, especially in the area of mass tort
litigation."
7. See id. at 593 (citing KARL POPPER, CONJECTURES AND REFUTATIONS: THE
GROWTH OF SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE 37 (5th ed. 1989)).
8. Id. at 593-94.
9. See infra notes 52, 58 for relevant articles.
10. See Heidi Li Feldman, Science and Uncertainty in Mass Exposure Litigation,
74 TEX. L. REV. 1 (1995).
11. Id. at 1-2. At times, Feldman purports to remain neutral on the question of
whether Daubert sets a good standard. See id. But only a page later she calls Daubert
.a sensible approach to the admissibility of scientific evidence." Id. at 3. She later
criticizes Frye for setting standards that do not accurately represent scientific practice.
See id. at 6-7. The whole tenor of the piece, in short, is that Daubert represents a good
development in the law of evidence, even if this will not reduce "uncertainty" in mass
exposure litigation.
12. I am not concerned in this Article with Feldman's other main thesis (which
occupies the second half of her paper): namely, that making standards of admissibility
more "scientific" will not, as "conservatives" believe, reduce uncertainty, and hence,
reduce litigation. See id at 18-43. To the contrary, "science is severely uncertain about
the causal effects of the substances and products that figure so prominently in
contemporary tort litigation." .1d. at 2-3. I do note in passing that the argument of this
half of Feldman's paper strikes me as being either trivial (uncertainty about causation
"strikes at the heart of the tort system," id. at 34) or unsupported ("one example,"
Feldman concedes, "does not establish the contention" that scientific standards of
admissibility will yield uncertainty in most mass exposure cases, id. at 33, but no other
evidence is adduced; indeed, one colleague involved in breast implant litigation tells me
EPISTEMOLOGY OF ADMISSIBILITY
In this Article, I take issue with Professor Feldman's argu-
ment. For even if "revised empiricist" philosophy of science were
the dominant, or even the correct, philosophy of science, there
would be no reason to think admissibility standards ought to
conform to it: Feldman seems to confuse the philosopher's ques-
tion, "What is the best account of scientific method?" with the
lawyer's question, 'That is the best criterion for judges to use in
deciding the admissibility of scientific evidence?" Yet the philoso-
pher can provide the lawyer with good epistemological reasons
for keeping these questions separate-reasons that Feldman
ignores or downplays. Philosophy of science and the rules of evi-
dence are both concerned with "epistemic norms": norms for how
scientists should form beliefs in the former case; norms for how
juries should form beliefs about disputed matters of fact in the
latter case. A central theme of contemporary "naturalized" epis-
temology has been the need to tailor our normative advice about
belief formation to the realities of how epistemic pro-
cesses-processes for the acquisition of knowledge-work,
whether they involve individual mechanisms (e.g. perception) or
social mechanisms (e.g. trials). 3 In particular, norms for belief-
formation must be sensitive to the epistemic limits of would-be
knowers: that is, the handicaps-intellectual, cognitive, tempo-
ral, material-that all real knowers operate under. If scientific
knowers differ, as of course they do, from the "knowers" that
comprise juries and that sit on the bench, then it should be sur-
prising, from the perspective of naturalized epistemology, that
that the scientific evidence is rather clear that implants do not cause health problems).
The more interesting, and important, contribution of Feldman's paper, as I read it, is
contained in the first half on Daubert and philosophy of science. In correspondence,
Feldman suggests that she does not share this understanding of the relative
importance of the different sections of her paper.
13. This view of epistemology, which now dominates philosophical research in the
area, owes most to the work of Alvin Goldman. See, e.g., ALVIN I. GOLDMAN,
EPISTEMOLOGY AND COGNITION (1986) [hereinafter GOLDMAN, EPISTEMOLOGY]; Alvin I.
Goldman, Foundations of Social Epistemics, 73 SYNTHESE 109 (1987). For an application
of similar themes to the epistemology of science, see Larry Laudan, Normative
Naturalism, 57 PHIL. SCl. 44 (1990). For a general survey of the influence of the
"naturalistic" approach, see Philip Kitcher, The Naturalists Return, 101 PHI. REV. 53
(1992). The Goldmanesque branch of naturalized epistemology (which retains the
normative ambitions of traditional epistemology) must be distinguished from the
Quinean branch, which makes "epistemology" a purely descriptive science of human
cognition. I try to sort out these strands of naturalism in my Naturalism and
Naturalized Jurisprudence, in ANALYZING LAW: NEW ESSAYS IN LEGAL THEORY (Brian
Bix ed., forthcoming 1998).
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the same norms for belief-formation should apply to both groups.
Yet it is precisely this conclusion that Feldman appears to
draw.14
II. PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY OF EVIDENCE
Feldman, drawing on an account by the philosopher of mind
Patricia Smith Churchland, 5 presents with admirable clarity one
episode in the evolution of twentieth-century philosophy of sci-
ence: the movement from logical empiricism to what Feldman
calls "revised empiricism."16 I shall just recap the bold outlines of
the story.1 Logical empiricists held that what distinguishes sci-
ence is its commitment to testability, to seeing whether scientific
claims are borne out by our observations. Karl Popper 8 sug-
gested that the hallmark of science was not simply "testability,"
but more precisely falsifiability: that is, the possibility that the
theory can be shown to be inconsistent with our experience. 9 In
14. I should note that throughout the article, Feldman is silent on a crucial
comparative question. Assuming that we want juries to take greater cognizance of
scientific uncertainty (but as Feldman correctly notes, we do not always want this, see
Feldman, supra note 10, at 42-43), the only reason to prefer Daubert is if it is more
likely to permit evidence of genuine scientific uncertainty than would Frye. (Strictly
speaking, we want to know how each set of standards strikes the balance between:
admitting evidence of genuine scientific uncertainty versus admitting evidence of
dispute between genuine science and 'junk' science.) Yet Feldman adduces no evidence
on this comparative question: for all we know, Frye may reveal genuine scientific
uncertainty as often as Daubert. Indeed, it is striking that in Feldman's own lengthy
and interesting hypothetical case, concerning litigation over breast implants, see id. at
18-33, the Frye test would almost certainly permit admission of the conflicting scientific
opinion, since as Feldman repeatedly notes, it all satisfies the "general acceptance"
prong of Daubert-which is, of course, taken over from Frye. See Daubert v. Merrell
Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 594 (1993).
Indeed, there is an even stronger reason to think that Daubert will be more
restrictive, rather than less restrictive, than Frye: for Frye applied only to novel
scientific evidence, whereas Daubert reaches all scientific evidence. This means that
there will be many cases under a Daubert regime in which the trial judge will be
empowered to assess the admissibility of scientific evidence that under the Frye regime
would have raised no special evidentiary issues.
15. See PATRICIA SmITH CtuRCHLAND, NEURopimLOsOPnY: TOWARD A UNIFIED
SCIENCE OF THE MIND-BRAIN 252-75 (1986).
16. See Feldman, supra note 10, at 10-48.
17. This is my own version, though it has basic affinities with Feldman's.
18. As Feldman rightly notes, on standard accounts of "logical empiricism,"
Popper is not a member of that school, though he has certain affinities. See Feldman,
supra note 10, at 10 n.47. For an accessible and more detailed discussion, see Sean
O'Connor, The Supreme Court's Philosophy of Science: Will the Real Karl Popper Please
Stand Up?, 35 JuRmmTRCS J. 263 (1995).
19. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593 (citing KARL POPPER, CONJECTURES AND
REFUTATIONS: THE GROWTH OF SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE 37 (5th ed. 1989).
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the 1950's and 1960's, this traditional empiricist account of sci-
entific method ran into serious trouble over two main issues.20
First, "theoretical" statements (which are to be tested) cannot be
simply demarcated from "observation" statements (the ones
against which we test theory). Observation, various philosophers
argued, is itself "theory-laden."2 It appears, then, that theories
are not tested against the world, but rather against other (im-
plicit) theories about the world. Second, the problem of "auxil-
iary hypotheses" renders all testing (and especially falsification)
problematic.22 Recall, for example, the Biblical story of King Sol-
omon,23 in which Solomon must decide which of two women is
the real mother of a particular child. Suppose Solomon hypoth-
esizes that woman A is the real mother of the child, while
woman B is not. Solomon tests the hypothesis by proposing that
each woman get half of the child. If his hypothesis is correct,
then he predicts that A will decline to "split" the child, and will
let woman B keep the whole child. But notice that this prediction
depends on an auxiliary hypothesis that the Biblical story never
mentions: namely, that a real mother's concern for the well-being
of her child is always stronger than her jealousy that another
should have her child. Now suppose that, contrary to the predic-
tion, A is eager to split the child, rather than let B just have the
child. Logically, this is compatible with the hypothesis that A is
the real mother, if we reject the auxiliary hypothesis. If we re-
main committed, however, to the auxiliary hypothesis, then ex-
perience falsifies the original hypothesis. But notice that experi-
20. For a more adequate discussion of the relevant developments, see Frederick
Suppe, The Search for Philosophic Understanding of Scientific Theories, in THE
STRucTuRE OF SCIENTIFIC THEORIES 3 (Frederick Suppe ed., 2d ed. 1977).
21. The classic sources on this point include: NORWOOD RUSSELL HANSON,
PATTERNS OF DISCOVERY (1958); the papers collected in 1 PAUL K. FEYERABEND,
REALISM, RATIONALISM AND SCIENTIFIC METHOD (1981); and THOMAS KUHN, THE
STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS (2d ed. 1970). For related and also influential
critiques of the theory/observation distinction that was central to positivist philosophy
of science, see Grover Maxwell, The Ontological Status of Theoretical Entities, in 3
SCIENTIFIC EXPLANATION, SPACE AND TItE 3 (Herbert Feigl & Grover Maxwell eds.,
1962); Hilary Putnam, What Theories Are Not, in LOGIC, METHODOLOGY, AND
PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE 240 (Ernest Nagel et al. eds., 1962); and Peter Achinstein, The
Problem of Theoretical Terms, 2 A1%1. PHIL. Q. 193 (1965).
22. See PIERRE DUHEhi, THE AIM AND STRUCTURE OF PHYSICAL THEORY (Philip P.
Wiener trans., Princeton Univ. Press 1954) (1914); WILLARD VAN ORMAN QUINE, WORD
AND OBJECT (1960).
23. See 1 Kings 3:16-28.
24. I owe the idea for this charming example to Gila Sher.
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ence itself appears to do no work in determining which hypothesis
we discard. This seems to undermine the empiricist commitment
to testability.
The "revised empiricists," on Feldman's recounting, acknowl-
edge both problems (though Feldman does not frame them quite
this way) and seek a solution in the recognition that science "is a
collective process comprised of institutionalized educational and
scholarly practices that shape and check individual judgment."25
In other words, that "theory" is demarcated from "observation,"
or that some auxiliary hypotheses are held in place, while test-
ing other hypotheses, are conceded to be matters that are fixed
at any particular time by the practices of the scientific commu-
nity. Yet science still "progresses" on this account. As Feldman
puts it (following Kuhn):
[Sicience progresses as scientists trade in one theory for an-
other, as they collectively come to recognize that a rival to the
established theory better satisfies the various scientific desid-
erata-predictive power, simplicity, unity of theory, fruitful-
ness, and so on.... The impetus for change arises from short-
comings in the settled view. As scientists work with a theory,
they find that there are phenomena it either cannot explain or
can explain only by adding ad hoc premises and assump-
tions.... As scientists become disenchanted with the resources
of prevailing theory, -they consider alternatives more carefully.2
Thus, "revised empiricism," unlike logical empiricism, assigns
proper weight to the Tole of social factors in the constitution of
scientific knowledge: "[Sicientists' collective judg-
ments-facilitated and established through devices such as peer
review and publication and measured by general accep-
tance-are as distinctively characteristic of science as testability
itself."7 This supports Feldman's ingenious rationalization and
defense of the Court's inclusion of "peer review" as a factor in
considering admissibility in Daubert.5 Although the Court did
not (as Feldman notes) have anything like this rationale in mind,
Feldman's argument supplies a clever post-hoc justification of
the test the Court set out.
25. Feldman, supra note 10, at 15.
26. Id. (footnotes omitted). It remains unclear, in this account, why this is
"progress" along any epistemic dimension. See infra note 39 and accompanying text.
27. Feldman, supra note 10, at 10.
28. See id. at 16.
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A. A Short Detour in the Philosophy of Science: Empiricism or
Realism?
Historically and philosophically, there are worries about
certain aspects of this picture. Feldman claims, for example, that
"revised empiricism... dominates late-twentieth-century philos-
ophy of science."29 By "empiricism," Feldman plainly does not
mean the technical doctrine in philosophy of science that it is
reasonable not to accept as real the unobservable entities posited
by scientific theories; for such a view may have been the majority
view among Logical Empiricists in the middle of this century,
but it is plainly a minority view today.30 Feldman means "empiri-
cism" in a much broader, and less philosophically contentious
sense: namely, as a commitment to the testability of theories
against experience. In this sense, of course, almost everyone in
philosophy of science for the past several hundred years has
been an "empiricist."
The key question, then, is what is meant by "revised" empiri-
cism. Feldman is explicit that the views that purportedly "domi-
nate" contemporary philosophy of science are those of the "con-
temporary theorists-including Thomas Kuhn, Imre Lakatos,
and Helen Longino [who] maintain commitments to empiricism
and to the idea that science is a distinctive human enterprise."31
This is odd on several scores, not the least of which is that Kuhn
and Lakatos are hardly contemporaries. 2 For one thing, this
29. Id. at 10.
30. The leading proponent is BAS C. VAN FRAAssEN, THE SCmNTIFIC IAGE (1980).
See also, Lawrence Sklar, Foundational Physics and Empiricist Critique, in 14
SCIENTIFC THEORIES 136 (C. Wade Savage ed., 1990).
31. Feldman, supra note 10, at 13.
32. Kuhn recently died and, in any case, made his last significant contributions
to the field more than two decades ago; Lakatos died in the 1970s, and his major work,
of course, predates Kul's work. Longino, by contrast, is a contemporary, though her
views could hardly be described as "dominating" contemporary philosophy of science.
Indeed, one would have thought the most powerful account reconciling the "social"
forces at play in science with the essential objectivity of scientific progress is that
found in the work of Philip Kitcher. See, e.g., PHILIP KITCHER, THE ADVANCEuENT OF
SCIENCE (1993) [hereinafter KTCHER, ADVANCEMENT OF SCIENCE]; Philip Kitcher, The
Division of Cognitive Labor, 87 J. PHIL. 5 (1990). Kitcher, however, takes himself quite
explicitly to be moving beyond the Kuhnian tradition-in part by embracing the
scientific realism, discussed infra note 37. (He also construes Longino, as I think most
philosophers of science do, as presenting a more debunking account of the epistemic
pretensions of science, whatever her stated ambitions. See KITCHER, ADVANCEMENT OF
SCIENCE, supra, at 303 n.1.)
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way of putting it reinforces the unfortunate impres-
sion-apparently widespread in the humanities,3 and certainly
in law schools' 4-- that Kuhn, in particular, marks the last impor-
tant development in post-positivist philosophy of science. While
Feldman correctly emphasizes the later Kuhn's attempt to dis-
tance his views from the more explicitly debunking views of sci-
ence in writers like Feyerabend,35 it is still misleading to suggest
that Kuhn's views circa 1970 dominate contemporary philosophy
of science. Indeed, the major event in post-Kuhnian and post-
Quinean 6 philosophy of science-an event nowhere mentioned in
Feldman's discussion-has been the turn away from the techni-
cal doctrine of "empiricism," noted above, in favor of "realism":
the view that scientific theories are literally true (i.e. the
unobservable entities posited by such theories really exist). Only
on a realist interpretation of science, many contemporary philos-
ophers have thought, is it possible to understand the sense in
which science makes objective progress.37 Indeed, many contem-
poraries have made the "realistic" turn precisely because they
doubt that views like the later Kuhn's will suffice to account for
objective progress in science.38
33. Cf LARRY LAUDAN, SCIENCE AND RELATImSM vii-xi (1990) (lamenting tendency
to view the relativism of Kulm and Feyerabend as the dominant views in philosophy
of science).
34. See Brian Leiter, Intellectual Voyeurism in Legal Scholarship, 4 YALE J.L. &
HUmAN. 79, 93-95 (1992) (noting tendency of law professors to view philosophy of
science as having ended with Kuhn and Feyerabend in the 1960s).
35. See PAUL FEYERABEND, AGAINST METHOD (Verso 1988) (1975).
36. Quine's attack on the distinction between "true in virtue of meaning" versus
"true in virtue of fact" marks one of the other major watersheds in the collapse of the
positivist program in philosophy of science. See Brian Leiter, Why Quine is Not a
Postmodernist, 50 SMU L. REV. 1739, 1746-1747 (1997).
37. This picture, in one form or another, informs the work of genuine
contemporaries like Richard Boyd, Clark Glymour, Richard Miller, Paul Churchland,
Philip Kitcher, and Peter Railton, among others. See, e.g., PAUL M. CHURCHLAND,
SCIENTIFIC REALISM AND THE PLASTICITY OF MIND (1979); KITCHER, ADVANCEMENT OF
SCIENCE, supra note 32; RICHARD W. MILLER, FACT AND METHOD (1987); Richard N.
Boyd, Constructivism, Realism, and Scientific Method, in INFERENCE, EXPLIANATION, AND
OTHER FRUSTRATIONS: ESSAYS IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE 131 (John Earman ed.,
1992) [hereinafter Boyd, Constructivisml; Richard N. Boyd, Realism,
Underdetermination and a Causal Theory of Evidence, 7 Nous 1 (1973); Clark Glymour,
Explanation and Realism, in SCIENTIFIC REALISM 173 (Jarrett Leplin ed., 1984); Peter
Railton, Explanation and Metaphysical Controversy, in 13 SCIENTIFIC EXPLANATION 220
(Philip Kitcher & Wesley Salmon eds., 1989).
38. In fact, another contemporary movement in philosophy of science draws
precisely this conclusion from the Kuhnian critique of logical empiricism. On this
view-associated with writers like David Bloor, Steven Shapin, Paul Feyerabend, Bruno
Latour and others-science is not about the objective growth of knowledge, but rather
803] EPISTEMOLOGY OF ADMISSIBILITY 811
Why, after all, should our "institutionalized process" of in-
quiry and our epistemic "desiderata" be reliable guides to the
truth? "Revised empiricism" runs the risk of collapsing the epi-
sternic pretensions of science into a mere sociological artifact;
only by accepting theories as literally true, philosophers have
recently argued, can we defend the claim that science is
epistemically special."9 Contemporary philosophers of science do
a sociological artifact, whose results are to be explained purely in sociological terms,
rather than epistemic ones. See, e.g., BARRY BARNES, SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE AND
SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY (1974); DAVID BLOOR, KNOWLEDGE AND SOCIAL IMAGERY (1974);
FEYERABEND, supra note 35; BRUNO LATOUR, SCIENCE IN ACTION (1987); STEVEN SHAPIN,
A SOCIAL HISTORY OF TRuTH (1994); Steven Shapin, History of Science and Its
Sociological Reconstructions, 20 HIST. ScI. 485 (1982). Science, on this view, is not
epistemically special, it is just sociologically special. Although Kuhn himself tried to
resist this conclusion, many philosophers have taken Kuhn's (and Quine's) view to
entail precisely this "relativistic" result. See LAUDAN, supra note 33; Kitcher, supra note
13, at 96. It is just these worries that have pushed many contemporaries away from
the empiricism, and toward scientific realism. See, e.g., KITCHER, ADVANCEMENT OF
SCIENCE, supra note 32; Glymour, supra note 37.
39. Several arguments have been influential here: what we might call arguments
from explanatory success, confirmation, and understanding. The argument from
explanatory success: only a realist interpretation of scientific theories can adequately
explain the remarkable success of methodologies that are, admittedly, theory-laden in
the ways Kuhn, Hanson et al. pointed out. See, e.g., Boyd, Constructivism, supra note
37. The argument from confirmation: if we accept scientific theories as more than just
"empirically adequate" (i.e. doing justice to the observable consequences), if we accept
them, in particular, as true descriptions of reality (including the unobservable parts of
reality), then such theories can be both better confirmed than their merely
observational counterparts and maximize the confirmational impact of any given piece
of evidence. Suppose, for example, we have empirical hypotheses A, B, and C, which
we could explain via theory "Zed," which postulates unobservable features of the world
to account for A, B, and C. If we accept Zed as a true description of reality, then
evidence that confirms A will also confirm Zed, which in turns lends support to B and
C. But without Zed, evidence for A would give us no reason to think B and C are
correct, since A, B, and C are all, as it were, independent hypotheses. To put it
colloquially- we get more "theoretical bang for the buck" when we are willing to accept
theories as true descriptions of the unobservable parts of the world. But this is plainly
a repudiation of empiricism. For one version of this argument, see Glymour, supra note
37. The argument from understanding only a realist interpretation of scientific theories
yields genuine understanding of the world. Understanding, it is claimed, requires
reducing the number of distinct phenomena we must simply accept as "brute;" that is,
we must show these phenomena to be unified by some underlying (typically
unobservable) mechanisms or structures. So if understanding requires unification, and
unification requires accepting the existence of unobservable properties and events, then
scientific understanding requires realism, not empiricism. For versions of this
argument, see Michael Friedman, Explanation and Scientific Understanding, 71 J.
PHIL. 5 (1974); and especially, Philip Kitcher's Kantian interpretation of the demand
for unification (as a condition, as it were, on the very possibility of scientific
explanation and empirical knowledge) in Explanatory Unification and the Causal
Structure of the World, in 13 SCIENTIFIC EXPLANATION 410 (Philip Kitcher & Wesley
Salmon eds., 1989), and Projecting the Order of Nature, in KANT'S PHILOSOPHY OF
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not speak univocally, to be sure, but if anything is characteristic
of their work, it is that the vast majority (including nonrealist
contemporaries like Laudan) repudiate the Kuhnian conception
of science.
B. Epistemic Norms
Historical accuracy aside, What is really important and wel-
come in Feldman's approach depends only on its commitment to
the idea of objective progress in science, notwithstanding the
failings of logical empiricist philosophy of science. This brings us
to a more serious worry: Feldman could be right in her philoso-
phy of science, but wrong in her implicit philosophy of evidence.
From the claim that Daubert's standards of admissibility track
the picture of science bequeathed by "empiricist philosophy of
science," Feldman draws the conclusion that the Daubert stan-
dards are preferable. ]But this hardly follows: good philosophy of
science makes for, well . . . good philosophy of science (and
maybe even good science)4 but not necessarily good philosophy
of evidence. To connect the two we need something more.
Although Feldman presents no systematic argument on this
issue, she does observe at one point that, "[ijf scientists cannot
draw firm conclusions, the jury cannot do so in any principled
fashion, even if the expert witnesses claim to have conclusive
opinions on the question of causation."4' This neatly expresses
the core intuitive idea underlying Feldman's equation of good
norms for science with good norms of evidence. We can state the
argument more explic.itly as follows:
(1) the rules of evidence serve an epistemic value-truth;
(2) to promote this value, the rules set out norms for the
admissibility of evidence that are most favorable to
the discovery of truth;
PHYSICAL SCIENCE 210 (Robert E. Butts ed., 1986). For critical discussion of these and
other arguments, as well as yet a different defense of realism against empiricism, see
Railton, supra note 37.
40. Significantly, some philosophers of science deny that if scientists took
empiricist philosophy of science seriously they really could pursue good science. See
Railton, supra note 37, at 245-47.
41. Feldman, supra note 10, at 31.
EPISTEMOLOGY OF ADMISSIBILITY
(3) the norms of "revised empiricism" describe the way in
which science reaches truth;
(4) therefore, when the truth depends on science, the
norms of admissibility should track the norms of re-
vised empiricism.
This argument, though superficially attractive, is, unfortunately,
neither valid nor true. From the fact (if it is a fact) that "revised
empiricism" describes how scientists discover truth, it does not
follow that it sets out epistemic norms for how jurors should
discover truth. In short, the fourth premise does not follow from
the first, second, and third premises, and thus the argument is
invalid. We have already seen that there are reasons for wonder-
ing whether the third premise is true;42 we shall have occasion to
see momentarily that the first and second premises are also
false.
Notice, though, how this implicit argument figures in
Feldman's account. Feldman observes, for instance, that on the
"revised empiricist" picture, "[r]ival views are a valuable and
usual part of the scientific process, providing fodder and stimula-
tion for those researching in the mainstream."4" Thus Daubert is
preferable, since it will permit the admission of such rival views
more often than Frye." Yet plainly no one (Feldman included)
wants to contend that all rival views are valuable for science.
Thalean cosmology and Hubbardian scientology are rival views
to those espoused by modem science, but no one, presumably,
thinks they should be admissible into evidence. Platitudes about
the importance of "rival views" to good science-platitudes that
not even logical empiricists deny-do nothing to answer the law-
yer's question: what criteria should nonscientist judges employ
in deciding which rival views actually warrant admission?
Feldman, however, dismisses in a footnote the "academic
focus on admissibility,"" but without ever explaining why this is
not the only relevant focus for lawyers. Feldman dubs Daubert
the "sensible approach to the admissibility of scientific evi-
42. See supra Part IIA.
43. Feldman, supra note 10, at 16-17.
44. This crucial assumption is actually never defended by Feldman, and is
probably false. See supra note 14.
45. Feldman, supra note 10, at 3 n.10; see also supra text accompanying note 14.
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dence"' on the grounds that it marks "a more scientific approach
to admissibility."' "[A] blanket prohibition [like Frye's] on testi-
mony based on cutting-edge techniques, methods, and ideas,"
says Feldman, "runs contrary to a scientific approach to gather-
ing information."' But Frye, of course, did not place a prohibi-
tion on the gathering of information by scientists! Frye and
Daubert do not have anything to say at all about how scientists
proceed, only how courts do. Even if "revised empiricism" de-
scribes the correct epistemic norms for science-norms for how
scientists should form beliefs-it is simply not dispositive as to
the epistemic norms (Le. the rules of evidence) that should gov-
ern the courtroom.
Feldman's conflation of the two questions misses the central
issue of that branch of naturalized epistemology known as "social
epistemology"'9 (precisely the epistemology that informs much of
what Feldman calls "revised empiricism"). The social epistemolo-
gist asks: under the real-world epistemic limits of a particular
social process for the acquisition of knowledge, what episteic
norms actually work the best? Questions about what rules
should govern admissibility are, in this sense, questions of social
epistemology. As such, they must be informed by two principles
of social epistemology: epistemic paternalism and the "ought
implies can" principle.5"
Paternalism in any domain of legal regulation supposes that
rules should substitute the rulemaker's judgment about what is
best for agents for the agents' own judgments. Epistemic pater-
nalism substitutes the rulemaker's judgment about what is
epistemically best for agents for their own judgment. Assuming
that the primary epistemic value is truth, epistemic paternalism
entails designing rules of evidence that are epistemically best for
jurors, i.e. that lead them to form true beliefs about disputed
matters of fact. Doing so requires, of course, taking into account
46. Feldman, supra note 10, at 3.
47. Id. at 5.
48. I& at 7.
49. "Social epistemology is concerned with the truth-getting impact of different
patterns and arrangements of social intercourse... such as classrooms, courtrooms,
and assemblies." GOLDMAN, EPISTEMOLOGY, supra note 13, at 5. Traditional "primary
epistemology," by contrast, is concerned only with the individual's "cognitive processes,
structures, and mechanisms." Id.
50. On the former, see Alvin I. Goldman, Epistemic Paternalism: Communication
Control in Law and Society, 88 J. PHIL. 113, 115 (1991); on the latter, see Alvin I.
Goldman, Epistemics: The Regulative Theory of Cognition, 75 J. PHIL. 509, 510 (1978).
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both the epistemic frailties of jurors, and the epistemic limits of
the rule-appliers, namely judges. Our rules of evidence are gen-
erally premised on both considerations.
The "ought implies can" principle requires that normative
advice in epistemological matters not be designed for ideal know-
ers, but for real-world knowers: any piece of epistemic advice of
the form, "knowers ought to do A before forming a belief about
Z," must imply that "knowers can do A before forming a belief
about Z." In the case of rules of evidence governing admissibility,
this presents a double issue, for here we have both primary epi-
stemic rules and secondary epistemic rules (and sometimes the
very same rule can be understood as serving primary and sec-
ondary epistemic functions).5' Primary epistemic rules take into
account the epistemic shortcomings of jurors, such as their sus-
ceptibility to confusion and prejudice or their generally modest
level of intellectual ability. Secondary epistemic rules take into
account the epistemic shortcomings of judges, such as their gen-
eral lack of expertise in scientific matters. The rule of evidence
that excludes unscientific evidence is a primary epistemic rule in
the sense that it is predicated on the assumption that jurors
must be "protected" from junk science in forming beliefs about
disputed matters of fact. The rule of evidence requiring judges to
exclude unscientific evidence is a secondary epistemic rule in the
sense that it requires judges to make an epistemic judgment
about whether some piece of evidence is scientific or not.
Daubert is worrisome, in part, because it articulates a secondary
epistemic rule that seems insensitive to the "ought implies can"
principle as applied to judges. To put it crudely, Daubert as in-
terpreted by Feldman says: "Judges ought only to admit genuine
science, as revised empiricist philosophy of science defines 'genu-
ine."' But it is not clear (as many commentators-and the dis-
senters in Daubert-have worried) that judges actually can apply
successfully the relevant philosophy of science to the issues they
will confront.52
51. As Richard Friedman points out to me, there is a tertiary epistemic function
in the background here as well: namely, that involved when drafting committees and
courts of last resort draft primary and secondary epistemic rules.
52. Chief Justice Rehnquist questions the wisdom of requiring judges to become
"amateur scientists." Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 601 (1993)
(Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); see also Developments in
the Law-Confronting the New Challenges of Scientific Evidence, 108 HARV. L. REV.
1481 (1995) (noting that the "[t]heoretically appealing" criteria of testability and
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Thus, even if Feldman is right that Daubert articulates a
picture of science that is correct (corresponding as it does to the
purported best-going philosophy of science, namely "revised em-
piricism"), it does not follow from this that the rules of evidence
ought to track this picture. Courtrooms, after all, are not labora-
tories, and judges are not scientists. For one thing, the discovery
of truth is only one of the aims of adjudication under the Federal
Rules. The rules of evidence serve distinctly nonepistemic pur-
poses as well: the promotion of various policy objectives (like
encouraging the repafx of dangerous conditions)53 and the effi-
cient and timely resolution of disputes.54 It is not clear that mak-
ing sure that the evidentiary landscape of the courtroom mirrors
that of the laboratory promotes all three of these purposes. In-
deed, it seems that it quite clearly undermines the third.
This might be warranted, of course, if there were some signif-
icant epistemic payoff (in terms of the likelihood that jurors
would discover the truth). But this is where the commonplace
observation that judges (let alone jurors!) are not scientists55
acquires special importance: for Daubert requires an extraordi-
nary exercise of judgment on matters of considerable intellectual
complexity if the evidentiary landscape of the courtroom is to
match that of the laboratory-rather, say, than that of the Na-
falsifiability may be too complicated for courts to apply); Margaret G. Farrell, Daubert
v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.: Epistemiology and the Legal Process, 15 CARDOZO
L. REV. 2183 (1994) (arguing that judges are ill-equipped to handle the "daunting
responsibility" of determining whether scientific principles and methods are
scientifically valid, a determination best left to the scientists themselves, through the
"general acceptance" criterion); Randolph N. Jonakait, The Meaning of Daubert and
What That Means for Forensic Science, 15 CARDOzO L. REV. 2103, 2103 (1994)
(describing the Daubert Court's decision as "incomplete and often misleading" because
it demands that a judge determine whether something is "scientific" generally-as
opposed to determining whether something is good biology or chemistry-and this is
often impossible because there are no general standards and methods applicable to all
science generally that distinguishes "good" science from "junk"); Barbara Frederick,
Note, Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.: Method or Madness?, 27 CONN.
L. REV. 237 (1994) (arguing that in hard cases involving "novel" scientific evidence,
judges will necessarily substitute their own judgment for that of the scientific
community, because the Daubert guides given to judges are so vague as to allow too
much discretion).
53. See FED. R. EvID. 407.
54. See FED. R. EVID. 1,02, 408, 409 & 410. This point is, in fact, acknowledged
by Feldman toward the end of her essay. See Feldman, supra note 10, at 42.
55. See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, EVIDENCE 743
(1995) ("[Clourts are ill equipped to make independent judgments on the validity of
science. Most judges are not scientists, and they do not have the time to spend at trial
or beforehand to make fully considered independent decisions on validity.").
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tional Enquirer. One might have a very high opinion of the intel-
lectual caliber of the federal bench, and still worry that not only
does Daubert ask too much, but also its doing so is an act of futil-
ity given the all-too-human limits of judges. Rather than making
sure juries get an accurate picture of the world as seen by sci-
ence, Daubert will ensure only that juries get an accurate picture
of the world as seen through the often distorting lens of zealous
and resourceful advocacy.56
We plainly want our science in the courtroom to bear some
relation to real science, for the reasons set out above. But this
goal must be pursued in light of the serious episteic limits of
courts-intellectual, temporal, material. This is why the "aca-
demic focus on admissibility" that Feldman dismisses in a foot-
note is actually the correct focus. To be sure, it is interesting to
see that one (slightly outdated) view in philosophy of science
arguably recommends Daubert-at least as a philosophy of sci-
ence! But Daubert is not supposed to be a methodological hand-
book for good science; it is supposed to set out a standard for
good adjudication. No such standard can be formulated in indif-
ference to the epistemic limits of courts.57
III. CONCLUSION
I agree with those critics who argue that Daubert makes
unrealistic demands on the epistemic capacities of the adjudica-
tory process.58 But I also agree with those writers who find Frye
56. Surprisingly, Feldman sets precisely these considerations aside-yet these are
the considerations central to the lawyer's question. See Feldman, supra note 10, at 31-
32.
57. The Daubert Court itself is sensitive to this point. They try to gloss it by
expressing their confidence that the epistemic limits of courts do not preclude the
application of Daubert's standards. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S.
579, 595-97 (1993).
58. See, e.g., Paul S. Milich, Scientific and Technological Evidence: Controversial
Science in the Courtroom: Daubert and the Law's Hubris, 43 EMORY L.J. 913 (1994)
(questioning whether judges can actually evaluate disputed science on its own terms);
Katherine M. Atikian, Note, Nasty Medicine: Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals,
Inc. Applied to a Hypothetical Medical Malpractice Case, 27 LoY. LA. L. REV. 1513
(1994) (stating that Daubert's vision of judges as "gatekeepers" is "unrealistic," for
judges are not scientists; Daubert will in many cases impose "immense burdens" on
judges of understanding the proffered scientific evidence, for which they are not
trained); John W. Osborne, Comment, Judicial/Technical Assessment of Novel Scientific
Evidence, 1990 U. ILL. L. REV. 497 (noting many commentators' concern that judges are
not adequately prepared to make scientific assessments).
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too restrictive.5 9 But if Frye is wrong, it is not because of its out-
dated epistemology of science, that is, its failure to appreciate
the insights of "revised empiricism" (itself arguably an outdated
epistemology of science!). Frye is wrong for familiar lawyerly
reasons of policy and ethics. To my mind, the most compelling
consideration arguing against Frye is that the vast majority of
products at the heart of mass exposure litigation will have been
manufactured and marketed based on appraisal of their safety in
terms of the "generally accepted" scientific theories of the day
(were they not, claims would lie for more than negligence or
strict products liabilith!). Frye, then, poses the risk of presump-
tively favoring defendants in such suits, to the extent that it lets
only the prevailing scientific wisdom get through the gate.6" Yet
Frye's great virtue is its concrete recognition of the epistemic
limitations of the courtroom setting: courts are not laboratories,
but places in which (generally) nonscientists resolve disputes.
Thus, Frye sets down a convenient proxy for scientific knowl-
edge, namely acceptance in the scientific community (whatever
59. See, e.g., Arvin Maskin, The Impact of Daubert on the Admissibility of
Scientific Evidence: The Supreme Court Catches up with a Decade of Jurisprudence,
15 CARDOzo L. REV. 1929 (1994) (stating that the Frye standard is contrary to the
"liberal thrust" of Rule 402 of the Federal Rules of Evidence); Laura Etlinger,
Comment, Social Science Research in Domestic Violence Law: A Proposal to Focus on
Evidentiary Use, 58 ALB. L. REV. 1259 (1995) (stating that the restrictive Frye test is
not appropriate for testing admissibility of expert psychological testimony); see also
Ronald N. Boyce, Judicial Recrgnition of Scientific Evidence in Criminal Cases, 8 UTAH
L. REV. 313 (1964) (stating that Frye is impracticable because it does not allow for
application of novel and reliable forensic techniques that are used increasingly);
Frederic I. Lederer, Resolving the Frye Dilemma: A Reliability Approach, 26
JURIETRICS J. 240 (1986) (stating that Frye is "unduly conservative" in admissibility
of "novel evidence"; what is generally accepted might not represent the most accurate
method of scientific fact-finding); Recent Case, Evidence-Admissibility of Scientific
Evidence-Fifth Circuit Limits Permissible Scientific Evidence to Generally Accepted
Theories, 105 HARV. L. REV. 791 (1992) (stating that the Frye standard is too stringent
in toxic torts cases).
60. I am glossing over a much more complicated, but still exclusively "lavyerly,"
debate here. For example, one might think the presumption alluded to in the text is,
in fact, warranted, if the defendant really did conform its product to the existing state
of scientific knowledge. Moreover, in actual practice, Frye figured far more often as
protection for criminal defendants, rather than defendants in products liability actions.
Finally, the argument in the text supposes that the central rationale for Frye is
epistemic: but this surely is not quite right. For there may also be a "policy" concern
that juries are predisposed to return verdicts against large companies, and assuming
we do not want to redistribute wealth that way, we may want the rules of evidence
to make it harder, rather than easier, upon plaintiffs to appeal to novel scientific
theories in proving their case. Since these complications are tangential to my main
themes, I ignore them in the text. It bears noting again, though, that all these issues
can be resolved in indifference to the issues in philosophy of science.
EPISTEMOLOGY OF ADMISSIBILITY
the ambiguities attendant upon the notion of "acceptance").61 If
Frye is problematic, it may only be because it sets the threshold
of acceptance too high. Yet Frye succeeds in framing a realistic
epistemology of admissibility, one that takes into account, as any
good social epistemologist should, the epistemic limits of the
relevant knowers.
61. For relevant discussion of this problem, see generally Symposium on Science
and Rules of Evidence, 99 F.R.D. 187 (1983) (noting the "intractable ambiguity" of the
Frye standard); Bert Black, A Unified Theory of Scientific Evidence, 56 FORDRAm L.
REV. 595 (1988) (noting the "extreme incoherence and inconsistency" in post-Frye
decisions as a result of the ambiguous "acceptance" standard); Paul C. Giannelli, The
Admissibility of Novel Scientific Evidence: Frye v. United States, a Half-Century Later,
80 COLUM. L. REV. 1197 (1980) (calling into question the efficacy of the "general
acceptance methodology" insofar as it fails to determine the "relevant scientific
community" in which "general acceptance" is to be measured); Ed Koon, Note,
Evidence-New Federal Standard For Admission of Scientific Evidence: Daubert v.
Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 17 U. ARm LnTLE ROCK L.J. 135, 144 (1994) ("The
Frye test gives no guidance as to which experts should be counted, nor does it explain
whether 'general acceptance' means virtually everyone counted, a majority, or perhaps
only a substantial number."); James Lang, Note, Hearsay and Relevancy Obstacles to
the Admission of Composite Sketches in Criminal Trials, 64 B.U. L. REV. 1101 (1984)
(stating that although "it is agreed" that unanimity of acceptance is not required under
Frye, how much divergence is allowed is unclear).
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